I INTRODUCTION
Statelessness is not merely a legal problem, it is a human problem. 1 It has long been recognised that collective international action is essential 'to ensure that everyone shall have an effective right to a nationality ' . 2 Yet, although the international community originally considered the problems of statelessness and refugee movements to be intertwined, the decision in the early 1950s to establish two separate legal regimes resulted in a relegation of nationality, state succession and territorial changes, barriers to birth and other civil registration procedures, administrative oversight, renunciation of one nationality without acquiring another, being born to a stateless person, marriage or divorce, and denationalisation. 15 In the view of one leading scholar, the 'primary injustice' experienced by stateless persons 'is not that they cannot find a state to grant them citizenship but that the state which should grant them citizenship will, for various reasons, not do so. ' 16 As Blitz and Lynch have noted, although many stateless persons effectively 'struggle to exist' , 17 the conferral of citizenship on once-stateless populations offers 'very real and important material and non-material benefits at both the community and individual levels. ' 18 Yet in many countries, including Australia, there is no formal mechanism in place to identify stateless persons. While some may be discovered through the refugee status determination process, others may go undetected. Even when a stateless person is identified, there is no domestic legal status that attaches unless he or she is also recognised as a refugee or beneficiary of complementary protection. As such, he or she may be at risk of indefinite detention, or only be eligible for a temporary visa with a limited set of entitlements. While '[e]veryone has the right to a nationality' under international human rights law, 20 states do not have a corresponding duty to confer nationality, other than on certain children. 21 It is therefore 'for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. ' 22 As Weis notes, from the perspective of international law, 'the stateless person is an anomaly, nationality still being the principal link between the individual and the Law of Nations. ' 23 The two international treaties on statelessness are the 1954 Convention and the 1961 Convention. As detailed above, the 1954 Convention defines a 'stateless person' in art 1(1) as 'a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law' , 24 while the remainder of the treaty sets out the legal status of stateless persons. 25 It is designed to ensure that For the purposes of this article, the terms 'nationality' and 'citizenship' are used interchangeably. 25 While the 1954 Convention does not technically require that a person be outside their country, the rights regime is modelled on that contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus appears to assume that this is the case in conditioning rights to be delivered at the same level as aliens or most favoured nationals in some cases and of citizens in others. [Vol 40:456 'those who find themselves stateless need not be consigned to a life without dignity and security.' 26 Most stateless persons reside within the country of their birth or longterm residence. 27 As such, the answer to their predicament is more appropriately found not in formal recognition as 'stateless persons' , but rather through the opportunity to acquire or confirm the nationality to which they have links (for example, through the reform of nationality laws). 28 When the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems met in New York in 1950 to consider the desirability of a new treaty on the international status of refugees and stateless persons and ways to eliminate future statelessness, 29 the latter was separated out from the more urgent question of what legal status stateless persons should have. 30 Eliminating statelessness was regarded as an issue that required international cooperation and the adoption of treaties, and since the Ad Hoc Committee had limited time and resources, it decided to transfer this task to the International Law Commission ('ILC') which was already seized with the question of nationality, including statelessness. 31 In due course, the United Nations ('UN') General Assembly expressed its desire for an international conference to be convened so that a treaty might be concluded. 32 Accordingly, the UN Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness met in 1959 and 1961 to formulate a treaty on this subject. As Batchelor notes, its objective was to fill 'gaps created by conflicts of law. ' 33 26 UNHCR, Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, above n 10, 1. 27 Achiron and Govil, above n 11, 3, 11; Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World's Stateless (2014) 21. 28 'Statelessness was seen as ''undesirable'' from the perspective of orderly international relations, for every individual should be ''attributed to some State''; and it was also undesirable for the individual, because of its ''precariousness''': Guy S Goodwin-Gill, Introductory Note: Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (2017) United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/crs/crs.html>. 29 
ESC Res 248 (IX) (B), UN ESCOR, 9
th sess, Supp No 1, UN Doc E/1553/Corr.1 (8 December 1949, adopted 8 August 1949) 60---1. 30 Goodwin-Gill, Introductory Note: Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, above n 28.
Although the original intention was to draft an instrument to eliminate statelessness, this was considered too ambitious and the focus was instead confined to the reduction of statelessness. 34 Australia did not participate in the drafting process, but it ratified the treaty without any reservations in 1973 (on the same day it ratified the 1954 Convention). 35 The United Kingdom ('UK') representative at the Conference stated that '[t]he main cause of statelessness at birth was [said to be] the conflict between jus soli [nationality based on where one is born] and jus sanguinis [nationality based on one's descent -----eg, parents ' citizenship] . ' 36 This tension lay at the heart of the different approaches taken by states during the process of drafting the 1961 Convention. For instance, the Swiss representative argued that while it might be logical for immigration countries to grant nationality to every child born on their soil, many 'over-populated' European states 'could not, without seriously affecting their political and social structures, assimilate thousands of persons who had no real links with them and whose birth on their soil was often fortuitous. ' 37 Furthermore, states 'had to ensure that the persons concerned were adapted to the habits, customs and mentality of [their] nationals and that they would become good citizens. ' 38 A key challenge, therefore, 'was to find a way for the jus sanguinis States to co-operate in reducing future statelessness. '
39
In addition, as had been previously expressed in the ILC, some states emphasized the internal jurisdiction aspects of nationality and their desire to preserve their right to deprive someone of nationality in certain circumstances. Others argued that deprivation should not be used as a penalty, but thought it was nonetheless appropriate that nationality only be granted where 34 Ibid 257. The Conference had before it two draft texts prepared by the ILC: one on the elimination of statelessness; and another on the reduction of statelessness: Goodwin-Gill, there was a genuine link between an individual and the state (and not just the accident of where someone happened to be born). 40 The UK representative recommended that ' [t] he Conference should attempt to steer a middle course by drafting a convention which would secure many ratifications and at the same time represent an appreciable improvement in the lot of stateless persons. ' 41 The compromise finally reached enabled states to choose whether to grant nationality at birth by the operation of law, or upon an application being lodged as prescribed by national law. It also permitted states to retain the right to deprive someone of nationality in very limited, defined circumstances, provided that such an intention was notified at the time of signature, ratification or accession.
The purpose of the 1961 Convention, as set out in its Preamble, is thus 'to reduce statelessness by international agreement' . Although, as an international instrument, it cannot bestow nationality on an individual directly, 42 it imposes positive responsibilities on states to confer nationality in certain circumstances, including in relation to persons 'born in [their] territory who would otherwise be stateless. ' 43 It also prohibits the withdrawal or deprivation of nationality in various situations where this would render a person stateless. 44 As Guy S Goodwin-Gill has observed:
One of the most significant elements in the 1961 Convention is the fact that it imposes positive obligations on States to grant nationality in certain circumstances, by contrast with the essentially negative obligations contained in the [ In addition to the two specialist statelessness treaties, any assessment of the rights and entitlements of stateless persons must also take into account the widely ratified international human rights treaties that impose obligations relevant to the prevention and reduction of statelessness, and the protection of stateless persons. 49 For example, some prohibit discrimination in the enjoyment of rights on the grounds of 'national or social origin' or 'other status' (which clearly includes stateless persons). 50 The States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. 55 It is noteworthy that during the drafting of the 1961 Convention, the Argentine representative referred to art 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the right to a nationality) 56 'to emphasize the psychological importance of a child acquiring a nationality at birth and of knowing that he would have the right to keep it when he reached his majority, provided he complied with certain conditions. ' 57 Subsequent academic work has confirmed both the fundamental importance of and ongoing challenges in ensuring access to citizenship for children globally.
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Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides that 'States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their nationality' , 59 and 'shall 52 ICCPR art 24(2). 53 Ibid art 24(3). As noted in above n 21, this does not necessarily require states to grant nationality to every child born in their territory unless they would otherwise be stateless. 54 to better identify stateless persons and assess their claims. Australia is committed to minimising the incidence of statelessness and to ensuring that stateless persons are treated no less favourably than people with an identified nationality. Australia will continue to work with UNHCR, civil society and interested parties to progress this pledge.
64
While not legally binding, this pledge signalled a high-level commitment to improving the lives of stateless persons in Australia. It provides the background against which we analyse current Australian law to determine how fully it reflects Australia's obligations to protect stateless persons and to reduce statelessness through its citizenship laws. 60 Ibid art 9(2). Australia ratified the Convention on 28 July 1983 with no relevant reservations: 
The Australian Constitution does not confer plenary power with respect to 'nationality' or 'citizenship' on the Commonwealth Parliament, but rather confers plenary power with respect to the related topics of 'immigration' 65 and 'aliens' . 66 As the High Court of Australia has observed, the Constitution therefore 'does not identify any specific criterion for membership of the Australian body politic or for the withdrawal of that membership. ' 67 Hence, constitutional adjudication concerning the limits and constraints on parliamentary sovereignty in relation to citizenship law has centred on the extent to which there may be a concept of constitutional non-alien -----that is, the notion that a person may be outside the Commonwealth's aliens power because of a qualitative connection with Australia regardless of statutory entitlement to citizenship.
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In Singh v Commonwealth, 69 the High Court rejected the plaintiff 's argument that birth in Australia necessarily accorded her the status of non-alien, and thus a constitutional nationality that could not be displaced by legislation. 70 Indeed, although the High Court continues to insist that the phrase 'alien' 'involves a constitutional concept' to be interpreted by the Court, 71 and hence that 'Parliament cannot, simply by giving its own definition of ''alien'' , expand the power … to include persons who could not possibly answer the 65 Australian Constitution s 51(xxvii) refers to 'immigration and emigration' . description of ''aliens''', 72 Foster observes that the Court has 'consistently resisted arguments that Parliament's power is so limited' in notable cases. 73 It is possible that the Court would be more willing to intervene in a case of deprivation, as opposed to failure to confer nationality, and support for this proposition can be found in obiter comments. For example, in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Ame, 74 Kirby J stated that:
The deprivation of nationality, including nationality by birth and especially in cases affecting minority ethnic communities, has been such a common affront to fundamental rights that I would not, without strong persuasion, hold it to be possible under the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth. As a matter of etymology, 'alien' , from the Latin alienus through old French, means belonging to another person or place. Used as a descriptive word to describe a person's lack of relationship with a country, the word means, as a matter of ordinary language, 'nothing more than a citizen or subject of a foreign state' . Does that condition deny him the character of a constitutional 'alien'? It is unnecessary to decide that question now, particularly in the absence of full argument. That is because, at all events, and as the respondents submitted, the appellant is within the reach of the immigration power in s 51(xxvii) and laws supported by that power. There are some aspects of Australian citizenship law and policy that provide good practice with regard to the prevention of statelessness. 77 For instance, Australian citizenship law and policy does not discriminate against persons based on their gender, religion, marital status, ethnicity or other discriminatory grounds adopted by some countries (eg, whether a person is born out of wedlock).
78 Australian citizens are not at risk of having their citizenship revoked on account of extended time abroad. 79 They are permitted to hold multiple citizenships. 80 Further, in accordance with art 2 of the 1961 Convention, an abandoned child is automatically an Australian citizen 'unless and until the contrary is proved. that allow for the revocation or renunciation of a person's citizenship contain safeguards against rendering someone stateless. 82 However, despite these positive aspects of Australia's legal and policy framework on citizenship, other elements may render a person stateless (or at risk of becoming stateless). These are examined below.
A Prevention of Statelessness: Grant of Nationality to Avoid Statelessness
Article 1(1) of the 1961 Convention provides that a contracting state 'shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless. ' This may be effected either 'at birth, by operation of law' , 83 or 'upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf of the person concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national law. ' 92 This is also acknowledged in the Department's Procedures Advice Manual 3 ('PAM3') with respect to the ' Assessing claims of statelessness guidelines' . 93 However, the discretionary nature of the Minister's decision with regard to an applicant's 'identity' under s 24(3), combined with the lack of guidance provided in the Citizenship Act or other relevant legislation or regulations as to the exercise of that discretion, has the potential to limit the protection provided to stateless children born in Australia. The reference to 'identity' is not anchored in the 1961 Convention: there is no reference to such a requirement in the treaty and hence no comparative insights into its application in practice. As Kim Rubenstein has observed, the incorporation of the 'identity' test means that questions of identity may become central to the application of s 21(8) 'rather than an assessment as to whether the applicant is stateless. '
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As we have noted elsewhere, one of the key challenges for stateless persons is 'proving' their identity. 95 On account of not being recognised as a national by any state, stateless persons often do not have documentation as to their citizenship status. This may prevent them from obtaining other forms of identity documentation. 96 Given that applicants for conferral of citizenship under s 21(8) of the Citizenship Act are likely to be babies or young children, they will only be able to 'prove' their identity through their parents. Since their situation is likely to result from their parents' inability to transfer nationality (on account of their own statelessness), there is an inherent obstacle. 99 Additionally, the term 'identity' is not defined in the Citizenship Act or any other relevant legislation or regulations. There is no information on the Department's website (or otherwise publicly available) about the application process for conferral of citizenship under s 21(8), and the conferral of citizenship form does not include the option of conferral pursuant to that section. 100 At the time of writing, there were only two published tribunal decisions about the application of s 21(8) (conferral). In the first decision, the applicant (AP) was born in Australia in 2010 to a Nepalese mother and an unidentified 98 Citizenship Act ss 10(1)(a)---(e). 99 The extent of the guidance provided to decision-makers is as follows: ' Applications which are considered to meet the requirements of this section must be referred to [ The instructions provide guidance on policy in relation to the interpretation of, and the exercise of powers under, the Act and the Regulations. Decision-makers should be mindful that policy must not be applied inflexibly. Policy cannot constrain the exercise of delegated powers under the Act.
Refugee and Humanitarian -----Protection Visas -----All Applications -----Common Processing
Similarly, the instructions on s 24(3) identity requirements state, at 85 [5.27.2], that: Section 24(3) requires that the Minister must not approve the person becoming an Australian citizen unless the Minister is satisfied of the identity of the person. In addition to being a legislative requirement under the Act, the Australian community expects that decision-makers will not approve a person for citizenship if they are not satisfied of the person's identity. 100 Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Cth), Form 1290: Application for Australian Citizenship -----Other Situations (2016). The first few pages of the form, which discuss 'eligibility' to apply for citizenship via this form, do not specify the statelessness safeguard provided for by 21(8) of the Citizenship Act.
father, who was thought to be either an Indian or a Bangladeshi national.
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AP and the mother had previously applied for a protection visa, and although unsuccessful, the Department had found AP to be stateless. 102 While the Tribunal was satisfied that AP could not acquire Nepalese citizenship, it was not satisfied that he was not entitled to acquire Indian or Bangladeshi citizenship. 103 Part of the reasoning was that an alleged defect in acquiring such citizenship (absence of birth registration with the consulate) could be remedied at any time. Importantly -----and contrary to the Department's submissions -----the Tribunal accepted that someone who genuinely had no information about his or her paternity could fall within the terms of s 21(8)(d) of the Citizenship Act, and further that Australian citizenship should not be refused if there was 'irrefutable evidence that the person had no prospect of satisfying the procedural and administrative citizenship application requirements of the relevant foreign country. ' 104 The second decision related to a child born in Australia to parents of Cuban descent, who had lost their Cuban citizenship by residing for an extended period outside that country. 105 The Tribunal made a number of pertinent observations in relation to s 21(8). First, a decision-maker is only required to consider countries 'whose citizenship a claimant is potentially entitled to acquire' , not every country in the world. 106 Secondly, the relevant temporal aspect is whether the applicant is 'currently entitled to acquire it' (not whether it may be possible at some future point in time).
107 Thirdly, the focus is on the entitlement to 'acquire citizenship' , not simply to apply for it.
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In this respect, while someone 'with an apparent entitlement to acquire the citizenship of another country cannot claim to be not entitled to do so simply because mandatory, but straightforward, evidentiary or procedural steps have not been undertaken' , 109 one must not wholly exclude practical considerations from the application process. 110 In the instant case, the Tribunal found that there were 'significant barriers to the applicant's acquisition of Cuban citizenship' 111 that made it 'impossible, in any practical sense, for the applicant to acquire Cuban citizenship. ' 112 The Tribunal found that:
The steps that have to be taken amount to an effective prohibition against the applicant's acquisition of Cuban citizenship. They are not merely 'procedural'; they are so onerous that they negate his underlying eligibility for Cuban citizenship. The applicant is not entitled to acquire the citizenship of Cuba because the barriers placed in his path by the Cuban government effectively prevent him from doing so.
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As such, the applicant was eligible to become an Australian citizen. recently presented to the Australian Senate suggests that there are currently 38 such children. 116 Of those who have lodged an application for citizenship pursuant to s 21(8) of the Citizenship Act, few have so far obtained a decision in relation to his or her application.
Section 21(8) of the Citizenship Act does not condition eligibility on any particular immigration status or visa, although it does require that 'the person was born in Australia' . 117 In 2014, the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ('Migration Act') was amended to provide that a child 'born in the migration zone' is 'an unauthorised maritime arrival' if 'a parent of the person is, at the time of the person's birth, an unauthorised maritime arrival' , and 'the person is not an Australian citizen at the time of birth. '
118 However, despite the legal fiction that deems a person born in Australia to be an 'unauthorised maritime arrival' for the purposes of the Migration Act, it could not plausibly be denied that the person was 'born in Australia' for the purposes of the Citizenship Act. On the contrary, the 1961 Convention dictates a broad interpretation of the concept of birth in a state's territory in providing that:
For the purpose of determining the obligations of Contracting States under this Convention, birth on a ship or in an aircraft shall be deemed to have taken place in the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies or in the territory of the State in which the aircraft is registered …
119
It is also well established that a state cannot circumvent its international obligations by artificially deeming its territory to be excised or otherwise outside the purview of international law.
2 Access to Australian Citizenship for Those Who Arrive in Australia as Stateless Persons
If a stateless asylum seeker meets the criteria in s 36 of the Migration Act, he or she may be eligible for protection in Australia (as a refugee or beneficiary of complementary protection).
121 However, the form of protection to which 124 Ibid ss 21(2)(h), (3)(f), (4)(f), (6)(d), (7) The child may be able to demonstrate a relation to several adults such as: a genetic link to a biological intending parent, a social link to the other intending parent as well as a link to the gestational surrogate mother. Although the intending parents and surrogate mother will most likely all possess a nationality, it may not be possible for them to pass this on to the child. Furthermore, it may be impossible for the child to acquire either the nationality of the State of his or her birth or the nationality of his or her parents (intending parents or surrogate mother).
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Recent high-profile overseas surrogacy cases involving Australians have illuminated the risks involved for children in such arrangements, including ultimately being rendered stateless. 136 Partly in response to these cases, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs recently undertook an inquiry into the regulatory and legislative aspects of international and domestic surrogacy arrangements. It recommended that, inter alia: The final issue to consider in this context is a procedural one. Birth registration is an important tool for the prevention of statelessness because it establishes a legal record of where a child was born and to whom. 139 If a birth is unregistered and access to nationality is not pursued, children may grow up to become stateless adults. 140 Such adults are then incapable of conferring nationality on their own children, and statelessness may be perpetuated inter-generationally. 141 The importance of birth registration is reflected in the fact that one of the ten UNHCR actions to end statelessness by 2024 is to '[e]nsure birth registration for the prevention of statelessness' . 142 As the UNHCR acknowledges, 'lack of birth registration on its own does not usually make people stateless' , 143 but '[i]ndividuals can [certainly] be at risk of statelessness' without it. 144 The increased focus on birth registration as essential to establishing identity is also reflected in the fact that one of the Sustainable Development Goals -----the goal to promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies -----includes as a concrete objective the provision of 'legal identity for all, including birth registration' , by 2030. On 1 January 2016, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development -----adopted by world leaders in September 2015 at an historic UN Summit -----officially came into force. Over the next fifteen years, with these new Goals that universally apply to all, countries will mobilize efforts to end all forms of poverty, fight inequalities and tackle climate change, while ensuring that no-one is left behind.
UNHCR, Guidelines on Statelessness No 4: Ensuring Every Child's Right to Acquire a Nationality through Articles 1---4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
The SDGs, also known as Global Goals, build on the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and aim to go further to end all forms of poverty. The new Goals are unique in that they call for action by all countries, poor, rich and middle-income to promote prosperity while protecting the planet. They recognize that ending poverty must go hand-in-hand with strategies that build economic growth and addresses [sic] a range of social needs including education, health, social protection, and job opportunities, while tackling climate change and environmental protection.
While the SDGs are not legally binding, governments are expected to take ownership and establish national frameworks for the achievement of the 17 Goals. Countries have the primary responsibility for follow-up and review of the progress made in implementing the Goals, which will require quality, accessible and timely data collection. Regional follow-up and review will be based on national-level analyses and contribute to follow-up and review at the global level. child. 149 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted immediate birth registration to mean that it should take place as soon as practically possible, within 'days rather than months' after birth. 150 The 'right to a birth certificate is necessarily implied into the right to [immediate] birth registration' , 151 since '[i]t is the birth certificate that provides the substance to the right to birth registration. ' 152 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that a standard birth certificate should be provided free of charge at the time of the registration of the birth.
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In Australia, it is a legal requirement to register the birth of a child in each state and territory. 154 However, 'birth registration is not automatic upon the birth of a child, and a birth certificate is not automatically issued upon birth registration. ' 155 To register a birth in Australia, parents or guardians must complete and submit a birth registration application to the relevant state or territory authority. The required supporting documents and fees to apply for a birth certificate vary between each state and territory. 158 This is thought to be due to a number of barriers, including 'onerous identity requirements to obtain a birth certificate' , 159 poor literacy, a lack of understanding of procedures, administrative costs, a lack of knowledge of the importance and advantages of birth registration, and a lack of support from authorities. 160 Groups that are most commonly affected include culturally and linguistically diverse communities (including refugees) 161 and Indigenous peoples. Gerber and Castan observe that: a number of Australians -----predominantly Indigenous people and those from culturally and linguistically diverse … communities -----miss out on the benefits of citizenship and struggle to fully participate in society because their birth has never been registered … 162 Indeed, these issues have not escaped international scrutiny: the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has urged Australia 'to review its birth registration process in detail to ensure that all children born in Australia are registered at birth, and that no child is disadvantaged due to procedural barriers to registration' . 163 For children born in immigration detention in Australia or in a regional processing country, there may be an additional practical difficulty in accessing birth registration. For children born to asylum seekers in Australia, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection has indicated that 'contracted service providers are required to assist the parents to register the baby's birth and to obtain a birth certificate' and that the costs associated with the submission of completed registration forms are borne by the Department. 164 The onus is thus squarely on Australian authorities to ensure that such children have their birth registered and acquire a birth certificate. This applies both in relation to asylum seekers in immigration detention and those in the community.
Under Australian law, asylum seekers who arrive without a valid visa may be transferred to another country for processing and (if found to be in need of protection), for settlement. Nauru and Papua New Guinea are designated regional processing countries under s 198AB of the Migration Act.
165 Pregnant asylum seekers in Nauru are normally returned to Australia for their babies' birth, 166 although in September 2015, a child was born to an asylum seeker in Nauru. 167 There is no information publically available as to the process followed by the Department for registering the births of children whose mothers have been transferred to Australia from a regional processing country. 168 In its report on the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth), the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee recommended that 'the Department of Immigration and Border Protection ensures that the birth registration process is completed before any child born in Australia is removed to a regional processing country. ' 169 However, based on desk research, it is not clear whether this recommendation has been adopted.
If an asylum seeker gives birth in a regional processing country, there is no information publically available as to the process followed to ensure that the birth is registered immediately (or at all). Australia cannot relieve itself of its international obligations with respect to birth registration simply by sending asylum seekers to other countries for processing. 170 The Births, Deaths and Marriages Ordinance 1957 (Nauru) requires a parent of a child born on Nauru to notify the Registrar of 'such information as the Registrar requires for the purpose of registering the birth' within 21 days of the birth.
171 Further:
Where the notification of the birth of a child cannot be given by a parent of the child, the occupier of the building or place where the child is born shall, within twenty-one days after the date of the birth, notify the Registrar of the birth and furnish to the Registrar such information as the Registrar requires for the purpose of registering the birth.
172
Although Nauru has not ratified the 1961 Convention, the Constitution of Nauru (Nauru) provides that a child may acquire Nauruan citizenship by birth if he or she would otherwise be stateless. 
Ibid s 7(2).
173 Constitution of Nauru (Nauru) s 73: ' A person born in Nauru on or after the thirty-first day of January One thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight is a Nauruan citizen if, at the date of children born in Nauru may be able to acquire Nauruan nationality. However, this is by no means clear and remains an issue of ongoing concern.
B Challenges to the Prevention of Statelessness:
Withdrawal and Loss of Nationality
Under Australian law there are several ways in which a person may cease to be a citizen. 174 These include renunciation of citizenship; 175 revocation on the grounds of offences or fraud; 176 failure to comply with special residency requirements for those whose citizenship was not automatic; 177 serving in the armed forces of a country at war with Australia or a declared terrorist organisation;
178 or through other conduct that 'demonstrates that the person has repudiated their allegiance to Australia' . 179 It is noteworthy that many of these categories apply to all Australian citizens, regardless of whether citizenship was acquired automatically by birth or through naturalisation. The last of these was introduced in 2015 by the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth) ('Allegiance to Australia Act') and is considered separately in Part V(C) below. While the Citizenship Act safeguards against statelessness in some of these instances, 180 it does not provide complete protection.
Pursuant to s 34(1) of the Citizenship Act, the Minister may revoke Australian citizenship acquired by descent (or adoption) if a person has been convicted of an offence in relation to his or her application to become an Australian citizen, or obtained Australian citizenship as a result of third-party fraud. In both cases, the Minister must be 'satisfied that it would be contrary his birth he would not, but for the provisions of this Article, have the nationality of any country. ' 174 Citizenship Act pt 2 div 3. For a detailed analysis see Sangeetha Pillai, 'The Rights and Responsibilities of Australian Citizenship: A Legislative Analysis' (2014) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 736, 753---8. 175 Citizenship Act ss 33, 33AA. 176 Ibid s 34. 177 Ibid s 34A. 178 Ibid s 35. 180 The Citizenship Act provides some protection in relation to: renunciation by application (s 33(7)); offences or fraud (s 34(3)(b)); special residency requirements (s 34A(2)); a responsible parent's cessation of citizenship (s 36(3)).
to the public interest for the person to remain an Australian citizen. ' 181 The term 'public interest' is not defined, and neither the Act itself, nor any associated legislation or regulations, sets out the test to be applied. The Act does not contain any safeguards against being rendered stateless where citizenship is revoked in such circumstances.
182 Section 21(8) of the Citizenship Act does not provide a remedy since it applies only to persons who have never been citizens of any country (and who are not entitled to acquire the citizenship of another country, who are not a citizen of any country and who were born in Australia).
Article 8(1) of the 1961 Convention provides that a state 'shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless' , although it importantly contains an exception in art 8(2)(b) 'where the nationality has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud. ' However, the Citizenship Act provisions are arguably wider than the permissible exception set by the 1961 Convention in that they apply to 'third-party fraud' -----namely, where another person has been convicted of a specified offence which 'was connected with the Minister approving the applicant becoming an Australian citizen. '
183 There is no requirement that the applicant knew about or was in any way involved in the relevant offence.
C New Challenges to the Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness: National Security, Terrorism and the Withdrawal of Citizenship
In 2015, the Allegiance to Australia Act entered into force:
because the Parliament recognises that Australian citizenship is a common bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations, and that citizens may, through certain conduct incompatible with the shared values of the Australian community, demonstrate that they have severed that bond and repudiated their allegiance to Australia. the new provisions extend far beyond this. As Sangeetha Pillai has observed, the Allegiance to Australia Act 'represents the most significant expansion of the grounds for citizenship loss in Australia since Australian citizenship legislation first entered into force in 1949. ' 186 Although representing a radical shift in Australian citizenship law, the amendments reflect a recent legislative trend to introduce or widen powers of denationalisation in other common law countries, such as the UK, 187 In light of these deeming provisions, it is difficult to ascertain how any meaningful assessment of the potentially exculpatory (mens rea) factors listed above could be undertaken. Second, '[a] person aged 14 or older' who 'is a national or citizen of [another] country' automatically ceases to be an Australian citizen not only where he or she 'serves in the armed forces of a country at war with Australia' , but also where he or she 'fights for, or is in the service of, a declared terrorist organisation' (note that this fighting or service must occur outside Australia). 204 The Act is clear that '[t]he person ceases to be an Australian citizen at the time the person commences to so serve or fight ' , 205 and that this applies 'regardless of how the person became an Australian citizen (including a person who became an Australian citizen upon the person's birth). '
206 However, a person is deemed not to be in the service of a declared terrorist organisation to the extent that '(a) the person's actions are unintentional; or (b) the person is acting under duress or force; or (c) the person is providing neutral and independent humanitarian assistance. ' 207 However, given the lack of a clear procedure to make such determinations, discussed below, it is unclear how effective these potential defences could be in practice.
Third, the Minister may determine that a person ceases to be an Australian citizen if he or she has been convicted of a specified offence in contravention of named provisions of the 218 In the automatic revocation case, they apply to children 14 or over: Citizenship Act ss 33AA(1), 35(1). The conviction provisions do not specify an age, but because they require conviction, the usual age of responsibility would presumably apply: at s 35A(1)(a). As the Parliamentary Joint Committee notes, the offences listed in s 35A 'apply to children aged over 10 years of age': ibid 77 [2.262]. 219 Citizenship Act s 35A(1)(e)(iv). 220 Convention on the Rights of the Child art 3(1). 221 Citizenship Act s 33AA(9). 222 Ibid s 35(2). 223 Ibid ss 33AA(15), 35(10).
Importantly, unlike comparable provisions in the UK that permit the denationalisation of naturalised British citizens even if that renders them stateless, 224 the Australian provisions do not apply to people who are Australian citizens only. 225 Hence, any revocation on such grounds can apply only to dual nationals. 226 At first glance, the fact that these provisions apply only to dual nationals may suggest that they accord with Australia's obligations under the 1961 Convention, and indeed academic commentary and parliamentary scrutiny to date appears to accept that this is so. 227 However, in our view, the amendments have the potential to render persons stateless because there are insufficient safeguards to ensure that a person is in fact a dual citizen before his or her citizenship is revoked. 228 These concerns are particularly pertinent to the first two categories, since conduct that falls within them gives rise to 'automatic' renunciation of citizenship, without the explicit need for any 224 229 This is in contrast to other comparable regimes where compliance with the 1961 Convention is understood to require specific consideration of the issue of statelessness. For example, in Canada, the relevant legislation explicitly provides that revocation provisions 'do not operate so as to authorize any decision, action or declaration that conflicts with any international human rights instrument regarding statelessness to which Canada is signatory' , 230 and requires that the Minister must have 'reasonable grounds to believe the person is a citizen' of another country before pursuing revocation.
231 By contrast, the Australian amendments neither reference international law obligations pertaining to statelessness, 232 nor contain a comparable factual assessment as a condition precedent to revocation in every case.
In light of Australia's obligation not to 'deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless' , 233 the onus is on the Australian government to ensure that a person is indeed a dual national prior to any revocation of Australian citizenship. This requires the government to investigate with the 'competent authority' of the person's presumed other state of nationality as to whether the person is, in fact, a citizen. 234 This assessment involves an analysis not only of the legislation of the other state, 'but also ministerial decrees, regulations, orders, judicial case law (in countries with a tradition of precedent) and, where appropriate, customary practice. ' Competence in this context relates to the authority responsible for conferring or withdrawing nationality from individuals, or for clarifying nationality status where nationality is acquired or withdrawn automatically. The competent authority or authorities will differ from State to State and in many cases there will be more than one competent authority involved. 235 Applying this approach of examining an individual's position in practice may lead to a different conclusion than one derived from a purely formalistic analysis of the application of nationality laws of a country to an individual's case. A State may not in practice follow the letter of the law, even going so far as to ignore its substance. The reference to 'law' in the definition of statelessness in Article 1(1) therefore covers situations where the written law is substantially modified when it comes to its implementation in practice. 237 ment declined to accept him as a Vietnamese citizen in practice. 244 Notwithstanding this, his appeal to the UK Supreme Court was unsuccessful because the court adopted a very technical approach to assessing whether or not he was a Vietnamese national. 245 Indeed, the need for an explicit assessment of dual nationality is acknowledged in other contexts in the Citizenship Act. For example, in the context of renunciation, s 33(7) of the Citizenship Act provides:
The Minister must not approve the person renouncing his or her Australian citizenship unless the Minister is satisfied that the person:
(a) is a national or citizen of a foreign country immediately before the Minister's decision on the application; or (b) will, if the Minister approves the application, become a national or citizen of a foreign country immediately after the approval.
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Further, in the context of cessation of citizenship following conviction of an offence, new s 35A(1)(c) provides that '[t]he Minister may determine in writing that a person ceases to be an Australian citizen if ' , inter alia, 'the person is a national or citizen of a country other than Australia at the time when the Minister makes the determination' . In addition, the Minister must be 'satisfied that the conduct of the person to which the conviction or convictions relate demonstrates that the person has repudiated their allegiance to Australia' , 247 and that, having regard to a list of factors, including most relevantly, 'the person's connection to the other country of which the person is a national or citizen and the availability of the rights of citizenship of that country to the person' , 248 it is 'not in the public interest for the person to remain an Australian citizen' . 249 However, with respect to ss 33AA(1) and 35(1)(b)(i) -----the two new categories of constructive renunciation of citizenship -----neither the legislation itself, nor anything in the background materials, provides guidance as to how the Australian government will verify that a person is a dual national. As Irving and Thwaites observe, 'the purported ''automaticity'' of these revocation mechanisms has been treated as making it unnecessary to provide for any 244 Ibid 1595---6 [3]. 245 Ibid 1606 [38] . 246 See also Citizenship Act s 34(3)(b). 247 Ibid s 35A(1)(d). 248 Ibid s 35A(1)(e)(v). 249 Ibid s 35A(1)(e). decision-maker' since revocation 'just happens when the relevant conduct is undertaken' . 250 While the Minister is required to 'give, or make reasonable attempts to give, written notice' to the person that they have ceased to be an Australian citizen, 251 such 'reasonable attempts' may not be successful since these provisions apply where the conduct is engaged in outside Australia, or where 'the person left Australia after engaging in the conduct' . 252 In addition, the notice requirement does not apply in certain circumstances, such as 'if the Minister is satisfied that giving the notice could prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia, or Australian law enforcement operations. ' 253 Further, while s 35B of the Citizenship Act prescribes the '[m]atters [that must] be set out in notices to persons who have ceased to be Australian citizens' , these are limited to the relevant conduct by reason of which the recipient's citizenship has been renounced. 254 There is no requirement that the Minister make specific reference to having made a finding that the recipient has another nationality or citizenship, to identify the relevant other nationality, or to disclose that such a finding was required.
These concerns are compounded by the broader inadequacy of Australia's system for identifying and protecting stateless persons, discussed in the companion article. 255 Despite Australia's pledge in 2011 'to better identify stateless persons and assess their claims' , 256 there is still no legislative basis for determining statelessness, and our analysis of the relevant procedures advice manual, tribunal and judicial decisions reveals a lack of consistency and clarity concerning the methods for ascertaining whether a person is indeed a citizen of another state. Not only is there no coordinated approach to collecting information about stateless persons in Australia, but the Department of Immigration and Border Protection has explicitly stated that it cannot estimate the precise number of dual citizens, acknowledging 'that the figure was ''not captured in the census because it is not a matter directly within the required to mount judicial proceedings are considerable; and judicial review (as opposed to merits review) is constrained. 263 It has recently been reported that a Citizenship Loss Board has been created within the executive to assist the Minister to assess cases of revocation pursuant to the Allegiance to Australia Act. 264 However, the Board is not established, constituted or regulated by statute. As George Williams has observed, neither the membership of the Board nor its proposed procedure has been published, and it appears that the procedure will be a closed one that will not accord procedural fairness to applicants. 265 There is an interesting question whether the High Court's decision in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth 266 would dictate that the rules of procedural fairness need apply to the Citizenship Loss Board, given that that case also involved a so-called non-statutory decision-making body established in order to assist the Minister to decide whether or not to exercise a discretion. 267 The 263 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has noted that the procedural rights difficulty, however, again lies in a person subject to such an assessment being able to effectively exercise a right to judicial review, given they will likely be outside the country and potentially unaware of the revocation (if, for example, the Minister's 'reasonable attempts' to provide the relevant notice fail). This reliance on a closed, opaque, internal administrative procedure rather than a judicial determination is at odds with the procedural safeguards adopted in many comparable jurisdictions. For example, in Belgium, 268 Israel 269 and the United States, 270 denationalisation connected to disloyalty and terrorism can only result from a decision of a court. In Canada, the Minister has discretion solely in relation to deprivation following a conviction, but must seek a declaration from the Federal Court of Canada where revocation is based on foreign service. 271 The UK appears to countenance very broad ministerial discretion, but as Pillai observes, such broad powers 'have attracted substantial criticism. ' 272 As she notes, 'while a person may lodge an appeal against a citizenship deprivation order, this does not prevent them from being deported from the UK. This can make it very difficult to initiate appeal proceedings. '
273 These concerns are a fortiori in Australia where a person may have their citizenship revoked while they are overseas.
In sum, we have serious concerns that the recent amendments to Australia's Citizenship Act fail to provide adequate safeguards to ensure compliance with Australia's obligations under art 8 of the 1961 Convention: namely, to ensure that Australia 'shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless. ' 274 While it is beyond the scope of this article to assess in-depth the numerous additional international law obligations invoked by a state's decision to denationalise its citizens, it is important to note that there is a range of other human rights considerations that may be implicated in such practices. The many relevant human rights treaties to which Australia is a party have been examined comprehensively by the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee Agenda Item 2. Nonetheless, the findings of the Board may be very influential in the exercise of ministerial discretion. 268 Ibid. on Human Rights. 275 As Matthew J Gibney has so eloquently articulated, '[t]he loss of citizenship transforms the citizen into an alien in the eyes of the state, stripping them of all rights held qua citizen and making them vulnerable to deportation power. ' 276 Given that citizenship is often a precursor to the enjoyment of many other rights, it is not surprising that the catalogue of rights potentially affected is wide, spanning both civil and political, as well as social and economic, rights. 277 At the core of concerns relating to denationalisation powers is a deeply ethical one. Gibney explains that many political theorists have explored the notion that, regardless of legal entitlement, 'continued residence over time in a state gives rise to a moral right to residence and thus to membership' , 278 on the basis that it is 'unjust not to grant people citizenship in countries where they have made their lives. ' 279 The notion of a right to citizenship jus domicilii is only in nascent form in international law, 280 yet international human rights law recognises that persons other than citizens may have a right to live in the country in which they have established their life. Specifically, the right to return to one's 'own country' is enshrined in art 12(4) of the ICCPR. This has particular pertinence to Australia given that the provisions effecting constructive renunciation can apply when a person is overseas, which has the effect of denationalising for the purposes of preventing return. 281 Yet, art 12(4) is not subject to any limitation, even on national interest or security grounds. 282 As the UN Human Rights Committee has unequivocally stated:
have an impact on the rights of other States' , 289 any analysis of the legality of depriving an individual of nationality must go beyond the provisions of the 1961 Convention alone. For instance, the implications of deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness may undermine states' obligations under certain treaties relating to 'terrorist acts' 290 (eg, with respect to 'the obligations of investigation and prosecution, in the fulfilment of which every other State party has a legal interest'), 291 and may also violate the rights of other states. Such violations may arise 'in a number of contexts, including deportation, refusal of re-admission, human rights, the obligations of the [state] with regard to the prosecution of international crimes, and applications for protection abroad. '
292
The general position in international law is captured succinctly by Goodwin-Gill. He explains that a state 'has no right … to deport a person whom it has made stateless to any State which has not expressly agreed to admit the individual' , or 'to refuse to readmit a former … citizen who has been deprived of his or her citizenship while present in another country' . 293 A state that seeks to export citizens believed to have committed 'terrorist acts' will likely violate its obligations relating to the prevention and prosecution of international criminal conduct, 294 and a state that has admitted someone 'on the basis of [their] passport would be fully entitled to ignore any purported deprivation of citizenship and, as a matter of right, to return that person' . 295 Goodwin-Gill suggests that it is not inconceivable that a person deprived of nationality in such circumstances could qualify for refugee status. 296 The Australia Act amendments are largely silent as to these implications, although in relation to revocation following criminal conviction, the Minister is required to consider, inter alia, ' Australia's international relations ' . 297 It is unlawful for a state to deprive a citizen of nationality 'for the sole purpose of expelling him or her. ' 298 To do so 'would be abusive, indeed arbitrary within the meaning of article 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (namely, that '[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality'), 299 and would trample upon the goodwill of other states. Paul Weis explained this as '[a] sort of estoppel on the part of the State of nationality' , 300 observing that:
The good faith of a State which has admitted an alien on the assumption that the State of his nationality is under an obligation to receive him back would be deceived if by subsequent denationalisation this duty were to be extinguished.
301
It 'would be contrary to international law not only as an abuse of right but as a direct infringement of the sovereign rights of the State of residence, ie of the right to expel aliens, which follows from its territorial supremacy. ' 302 Yet, 'banishment' appears to be a core motivation for the Australian amendments.
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In sum, there are compelling reasons for concern that the Allegiance to Australia Act does not contain sufficient safeguards to ensure compliance with Australia's obligations under the 1961 Convention. In addition, it risks violating a range of other international law obligations, including under human rights law. 297 Citizenship Act s 35A(1)(e)(vi). 300 Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, above n 15, 55 n 146. 301 Ibid 55 (citations omitted). 302 Ibid 57. 303 The then Prime Minister Tony Abbott described the revocation provisions as effecting banishment: Tony Abbott, '2015 Magna Carta Lecture' (Speech delivered at Parliament House, Canberra, 24 June 2015), cited in Irving and Thwaites, above n 227, 148.
